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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

JAMES SICILIANO,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
9378

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's statement of facts is incomplete in that it
substantially disregards the plaintiff's theory, particularly with
respect to defendant's negligence. It is, therefore, necessary to
briefly state the facts as they relate to the plaintiff's theory and
as they were found by the jury.

1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

On September 8, 1952, at approximately 9:00 a.m., plaintiff, an immigrant from Italy (R. 116) was told to obtain a
piece of wire hanging on a nail on a post in the defendant's
shop (98, 111, 112). Plaintiff then was 53 years of age, a
machinist for the railroad, and at that time had had 33 years
experience (96). It is stipulated that both the plaintiff and
defendant were engaged in interstate commerce ( 98) . Prior
to the accident when the plaintiff had used wire, he had obtained it from the tool room but the tool room had been
abolished two weeks before the accident ( 104) . When the
plaintiff reached for the coil of wire he had no difficulty seeing
it ( 113). It was a coil approximately 8 or 10 inches in diameter
( 113, 114) hanging over the top of a nail ( 115). Plaintiff did
not observe the position of the ends of the wire ( 115) . There
was no way for the plaintiff to know that the wire was dangerous or that it would spring from the appearance of it on the
nail ( 119, 120). As the plaintiff's right hand lifted the wire
from the post, an end of the coil sprung loose and flipped into
the plaintiff's eye ( 98, 99) . Plaintiff then dropped the coil
to the ground and the coil sprang further into a wider diameter
( 98, 99) . In sum, the evidence was that the position of this
particular piece of wire on the nail was that of a spring or coil
and in the particular circumstances it was unsafe for use, the
ends not having been wrapped around the coil to secure them.
As a result of the accident the plaintiff eventually lost the
entire use of his left eye.
The facts are detailed further in the argument. References
are to the page of the Record on Appeal unless otherwise
indicated.
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POINT I.
THE JURY'S VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
Throughout its brief, both in the Statement of Facts and
Argument, the defendant recites its own theory of the facts
and arbitrarily ignores the plaintiffs theory as it was adopted
by the jury. The defendant extensively treats the proposition
that a roll of wire hanging on a post is not dangerous and that
liability could not be predicated on negligence consisting solely
of requiring the use of a roll of wire hanging on a post. Whether
requiring the use of such wire as it is ordinarily hung would
constitute negligence in and of itself is not before the court
in this case. A closer look at the facts is required.
The plaintiff's theory was that a piece of wire 12 to 15
feet long was rolled into the position of a coil or spring. The
diameter of the coil was 8 to 10 inches. When the coil was hung
on the post the ends were locked either under the coil or among
some of the strands. There was, in other words, not simply
''a roll of wire hanging on a nail" but a spring-like coil 12 to
15 feet long, 8 to 10 inches in diameter, precariously balancing
in a position so that the ends were locked under or within the
coil itself. In this position the coil was a trap. It was, as
defendant admits throughout its brief, innocent enough in
appearance, but in fact it was treacherous.
Plaintiff was instructed to get the wire from the post and
bring it to the pit where he and Bob Wells were going to use
it to tie back a brake beam (98, 109, 189). Unaware of any
dangerous condition in the coil ( 113, 114), plaintiff raised his
right hand to a position approximately level with the top of
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his head toward the post ( 113) and lifted the coil from the
nail. The instant that the weight of the coil was released from
the ends of the wire, the trap was sprung. One of the ends
of the coil flipped "like lightning" and struck the plaintiff in
his left eye. Plaintiff dropped the coil to the ground. As the
coil hit the ground it sprung further so that the diameter of
the coil was larger on the ground that it was on the post
(98, 99).
The question before the jury and the question here is not
as defendants continuously recite, whether an ordinary roll of
wire hanging on a nail is a safe tool or safe equipment. In fact,
the jury was specifically instructed that a piece of wire with
loose ends hanging on a post at the defendant's shop could not,
in and of itself, constitute negligence (Instruction No. 20). At
the same time, ((Whether or not the manner in which this
wire hung on the post is negligence is for you to determine
based on all the evidence and such reasonable inferences as may
be drawn therefrom'' (ibid).
The evidence and such reasonable inferences as the jury
drew from it support two propositions:
(a) A hanging coil of wire in a position of spring or
tension where the ends are prevented from springing only by the
weight of the coil or the position of the strands is an unsafe
piece of equipment. That injury is likely from the use of such
a coil by one unaware of its cocked position is foreseeable.
(b) The piece of wire involved in this lawsuit was hanging on the post in such a position of tension as to constitute
a trap.
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The first proposition is demonstrated from the very piece
of wire (Ex. D-1) introduced by the railroad company in this
lawsuit. While the piece introduced into evidence is probably
only 20 or 22 inches in length, it is apparent from handling
and coiling it that unless the ends are secure, they have a
tendency to flip as soon as pressure on them is released. It is
to be observed that time after time during the trial, counsel for
the defendant wrapped the ends of the wire around the coil in
demonstrating the physical properties of wire to the jury. It is,
of course, a matter of common knowledge that wire is springy
by its nature. As the defendant stipulated during the crossexamination of one of its witnesses, if the ends of a roll of
wire are fastened around the coil, the ends cannot flip ( 187).
Yet the plaintiff's foreman, Paul Schenk, admitted that he had
never issued instructions that the ends should be wrapped
around the coil ( 18 7) .
The second of the two propositions is established, without
contradiction, by the plaintiff's own testimony. He stated over
and over again on direct and cross examination that when he
lifted the coil from its position on the nail, an end flipped out
and hit him in the eye. There is certain! y nothing dubious or
suspicious about this testimony. He told the same thing to everyone who inquired about the manner in which the accident
happened, starting with his foreman and going right on through
the railroad's claim agent. Further, he testified that when he
dropped the coil onto the ground, it sprung into a wider
diameter. The physical properties of wire are such that the
Court knows this springing action is possible only when the
wire is coiled in a position of tension.
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The jury necessarily believed the plaintiff's theory in
this case. Unless it believed that the wire was coiled in a position of a spring, it would have been required to find for the
defendant on the issue of liability under the Court's instructions.
Upon no other basis can the jury's decision be explained; moreover, the adoption of that theory is compelled by the undisputed evidence in the case.
Plaintiff does not quarrel with the general doctrine of
the cases cited by the defendant to the effect that proof of an
accident is not proof of negligence, and that there must be a
showing of an unsafe condition upon which to predicate liability
under FELA cases (De£. brief, 10-18). The jury in the case
at bar necessarily determined, however, that the particular piece
of wire in question was hung on the post in such a manner
as to constitute an unsafe tool or piece of equipment.
It is to be observed that the defendant itself proved that
the plaintiff could not have been solely responsible for the
accident. On cross-examination the defendant's attorney artfully
drew from the plaintiff the fact that he could not tell by looking at the coil, although it was right in front of his face, that
there was anything unsafe about it.

ceQ. You didn't have any reason to believe that if you
picked that wire up it would spring and flip you
in the eye?
"A. I didn't think it would spring." ( 120)
And again:

"Q. Mr. ~iciliano, when you s~w that particular wire
hangtng on the post you dtdn' t see anything about
6
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it to cause you to think there was anything wrong,
did you?
C(A. I didn't know it was going to flip on me." ( 119)
Apparently the jury found that, even so, defendant might
somehow have avoided the accident, and that an offset for
contributory negligence was appropriate. Defendant cannot get
any more comfort from adoption of its theory in part than
from the rejection of it in part. In substance, defendant simply
asks this Court to adopt a theory of the facts which the jury
rejected. The point is that Mr. Siciliano happened to be the
victim caught in the trap. He had nothing to do with hanging
the wire on the post. No other wire was provided to him. He
was told to use this particular coil.
The defendants are totally in error to argue ((There is no
evidence that the wire was not safe for ordinary handling."
In a given hypothetical case an argument might be tnade that
a roll of wire as it is customarily hung upon a post with loose
ends may be not unsafe for ordinary handling. But that is not
our case. The jury in the case at bar expressly rejected the
argument that this particular coil of wire was an ordinary one
or that it was hung in an ordinary way. The jury instead approved and adopted the plaintiff's theory that the coil was
hanging as a spring in a position of tension and that when the
weight was released from the ends, one of them sprang out
((like lightning" and injured the plaintiff. In this kind of a
case the authorities require the acceptance of the jury's verdict.
Common law concepts with respect to liability for negligence were drastically revised by the Federal Employer's Liability Act. It is not necessary under that act that employer negli-
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gence be shown to be the sole proximate cause of in jury· The
employer is liable if its negligence played ccany part at all."
The rule itself bears repetition. In Rogers v. Missouri Pac.
R.R. Co. (1957) 352 U.S. 500, 1 L.Ed. (2d) 493, 77 S. Ct. 443,
Reh. d., 353 U.S. 943, 1 L.Ed. (2d) 764, 77 S. Ct. 808, the
U.S. Supreme Court said:
ccThe jury was instructed to return a verdict for the
respondent if it was found that negligence of the
petitioner was the sole cause of his mishap. We must
take it that the verdict was obedient to the trial judge's
charge and that the jury found that such was not the
case but that petitioner's injury resulted at least in part
from the respondent's negligence.

*
*
(Under this statute the test of a
*

*

jury case is simply
whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion
that employer negligence played any part, even the
slightest, in producing the injury or death for which
damages are sought. It does not matter that, from the
evidence, the jury may also with reason, on grounds
of probability, attribute the result to other causes,
including the employee's contributory negligence. Judicial appraisal of the proofs to determine whether a jury
question is presented is narrowly limited to the single
inquiry whether, with reason, the conclusion may be
drawn that negligence of the employer played any
part at all in the injury or death. Judges are to fix
their sights primarily to make that appraisal and, if
that test is met, are bound to find out that a case for
the jury is made out whether or not the evidence allows
the jury a choice of other probabilities. The statute
expressly im~o~es liability upon ~e employer to pay
damages for InJury or death due tn whole or in part'
to its negligence. (Emphasis added.) [By the Court]."
c

*

*

*

*
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((The statute supplants that [common law] duty with
the far more drastic duty of paying damages for injury
or death at work due in whole or in part to the employer's negligence. The employer is stripped of his
common-law defenses and for practical purposes the
inquiry in these cases today rarely presents more than
the single question whether negligence of the employer
pia yed any part, however small, in the in jury or death
which is the subject of the suit. The burden of the
employee is met and the obligation of the employer
to pay damages arises, when there is proof, even though
entirely circumstantial, from which the jury may with
reason make that inference.''
The Supreme Court express! y ruled in Note 13 of the
foregoing opinion:
((Moreover, twhat constitutes negligence for the
statute's purposes is a federal question, not varying
in accordance with the differing conceptions of negligence under state and local laws for other purposes.
Federal decisional law formulating and applying the
concept governs.' ·urie v. Thompson, 337 US 163,
174, 93 L ed 1282, 1295, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 11 ALR 2d
252."
The majority of the Court pointedly observed that its
review of cases was because it was ((Cognizant of the duty to
effectuate the intention of Congress to secure the right of jury
determination ... " in this class of cases and that ((In a relatively
large percentage of cases reviewed, the Court has found that
lower courts have not given proper scope to this integral part
of the congressional scheme. . . . The decisions of this Court
after the 1939 amendment teach that Congress vested the
power of decision in these actions exclusively in the jury in all
but the infrequent cases where fair-minded jurors cannot bon-
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estly differ whether fault of the employer played any part in
the employee's injury." (Emphasis by Appellee.) In note No.
26 to the majority opinion the Court took the pains to cite 17
cases where lower courts were reversed for failure to allow the
jury's verdict to stand.
The Rogers decision has been applied and followed consistently by a majority of the court. Webb v. Illinois Cent. R.
Co. (1957) 352 U.S. 512, 1 L.Ed. (2d) 503, 77 S. Ct. 451; Shaw
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. ( 1957) 353 U.S. 920, 1 L.Ed
( 2d) 718, 77 S. Ct. 680; Futrelle v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.
( 1957) 353 U.S. 920, 1 L.Ed (2d) 718, 77 S. Ct. 682; Deen
v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. ( 1957) 353 U.S. 925, 1 L.Ed (2d)
721, 77 S. Ct. 715; Thomson v. Texas & Pac R. Co. (1957) 353
U.S. 926, 1 L.Ed (2a) 722, 77 S. Ct. 698; Arnold v. Panhandle
& S. F. R. Co. ( 1957) 353 U.S. 360, 1 L.Ed (2d) 889, 77 S. Ct.
840; Ringhiser v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. ( 1957) 354 U.S. 901,
1 L.Ed (2d) 1268, 77 S. Ct. 1093; McBride v. Toledo Terminal
R. Co. (1957) 354 U.S. 517, 1 L.Ed (2d) 1534, 77 S. Ct. 1398;
Gibson v. Thompson {1957) 355 U.S. 18, 2 L.Ed (2d) 1, 78
S. Ct. 2; Honeycutt v. Wabash R. Co. {1958) 355 U.S. 424,
2 L.Ed (2d) 380, 78 S. Ct. 393; Ferguson v. St. Louis-San
Francisco R. Co. ( 1958) 356 U.S. 41, 2 L.Ed (2d) 571, 78
S. Ct. 671; Butler v. Whitman (1958) 356 U.S. 271, 2 L.Ed
(2d) 754, 78 S. Ct. 734; Moore v. Terminal R.R. Assn. {1958)
358 U.S. 31, 3 L.Ed (2d) 24, 79 S. Ct. 2; Harris v. Penn. R.R.
Co. (1959) 361 U.S. 15, 4 L.Ed (2d) 1, 80S. Ct. 22; Conner
v. Butler (1959) 361 ·u.s. 29, 4 L.Ed (2d) 10, 80s. Ct. 21;
Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp. ( 1959) 361 U.S.
107, 4 L.Ed (2d) 142, 80 S. Ct. 173; Davis v. Virginian Railway Co. (1960) 361 U.S. 354, 4 L.Ed (2d) 366, 80S. Ct. 387.
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While some of these cases are under the Jones Act, they
expressly adopt the rules of the Rogers case for FELA actions.
In all of the later cases is tacit and explicit recognition of the
philosophy of FELA cases as stated by Mr. Justice Brennan
for the majority in Sinkler v. Missouri R.R. Co., 356 U.S. 326,
2 L.Ed (2d) 799, 78 S. Ct. 758 at 802, 8.03 L.Ed:
ccThis statute, an avowed departure from the rules of
the common law, cf. Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.,
352 US 500, 507-509, 1 L Ed (2d) 493, 499-501, 77
S. Ct. 443, was a response to the special needs of railroad workers who are daily exposed to the risks inherent in railroad work and are bel pless to provide
adequately for their own safety. Tiller v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co., 318 US 54, 87 L Ed 610, 53 S. Ct.
44, 143 ALR 967. The cost of human injury, an inescapable expense of railroading, must be borne by
someone, and the FELA seeks to adjust that expense
equitable between the worker and the carrier. Kernan
v. American Dredging Co., 355 US 426, 431, 438,
2 L Ed ( 2d) 382, 388, 392, 87 S. Ct. 394. The Senate
Committee which reported the Act stated that it was
designed to achieve the broad purpose of promoting
cthe welfare of both employer and employee, by adjusting the losses and injuries inseparable from industry
and commerce to the strength of those who in the
nature of the case ought to share the burden'. S. Rep.
No. 460, 60th Cong. 1st Sess. 3."
Detailed analysis of all these cases obviously is impracticable in this brief. Most of them are treated in an annotation at
4 ALR (2d) 1787 et seq. entitled ctSupreme Court Reviews of
Sufficiency of Evidence in Cases under Federal Employers'
Liability Act," where the annotator summarizes (p. 1793, note
8) that ccln view of the breadth of the rule stated in the Supreme
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Court (Rogers) case ... earlier cases decided in favor of the
defendant, although the plaintiff had obtained a jury verdict,
should be re-examined in the light of the Rogers and Webb
cases." It is significant that both of the U. S. Supreme Court
cases relied upon by defendant in Point I of its brief, namely
Wilkerson v. McCarthy, (1949) 336 U.S. 53, 93 L. Ed. 497,
69 S. Ct. 413 (De£. Brief 8, the court holding, incidentally,
that the jury should have been permitted to rule on the case);
Brady v. Southern Ry. Co., ( 1943) 320 U. S. 476, 88 L.Ed.
239, 64 S. Ct. 232 (De£. brief 8, 11, 12-14, 16-17) were
decided prior to the Rogers decision. To the extent that these
cases represent a different point of view in FELA cases, they
require appraisal "in the light of the Rogers and Webb cases"
(Anno. 4 ALR ( 2d) 1787 at note 8) and, it is submitted,
the many cases which have expressly adopted the point of
view inherent in these decisions.
The factual situation involved in some of these cases is
of interest by the way of comparison with the case at bar.
In Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. (1957)
352 U.S. 521, 1 L.Ed (2d) 511, 77 S. Ct. 459, a ship's baker
was injured when he undertook to remove ice cream from a
container with a sharp butcher knife. His hand slipped into
the knife blade. The Second Circuit held that the use of the
knife as an ice cream scoop could not have been foreseen
by the employer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the jury could conclude that the baker had been furnished no
safe tool and that since he was required to fill ice cream
orders placed with him by ship's waiters, the use of the butcher
knife for that purpose could be found to be foreseeable. The
could said that " . . . the standard of liability under the Jones
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Act is that established by Congress under the FELA .
and quoted the Rogers case in support of the decision.

,,

In Honeycutt v. Wabash R.R. Co. (1958) 355 U.S. 424,
2 L.Ed. ( 2d) 380, 78 S. Ct. 393, the employee sought recovery
for injuries sustained when a rivet gun with which he was
working under a railroad car discharged a metal clip and struck
him in the forehead. The trial court had entered a judgment
on a verdict for plaintiff but had been reversed by the St. Louis
Court of Appeals, 303 SW (2d) 153. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and ordered that judgment be entered on the verdict holding that the proofs justified the jury's
conclusion that employer negligence played a part in producing
the injury.
In Conner v. Butler ( 1959) 361 U.S. 29, 4 L.Ed (2d)
10, 80 S. Ct. 21, a railroad hose cutter was alighting from a
passenger car. A movable portion of the platform car secured
in a raised position by a latching device fell on his hand. A
judgment entered on a motion for directed verdict was reversed
by the Supreme Court stating that under the Rogers case ((the
proofs were sufficient to submit to the jury the question whether
employer negligence played a part in producing the petitioner's
injury." It is submitted that this case is extremely close on the
facts to the case at bar.
In Davis v. Virginian R.R. Co. (1960) 361 US 354, 4
L. Ed. (2d) 366, 80 S. Ct. 387, the plaintiff was injured while
shifting various railroad cars on its tracks near Norfolk, Virginia. The negligence charged was that plaintiff was required
to do his work too quickly and was furnished inexperienced
help so that he had to work faster than usual. The court said:
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nThe record indicates that petitioner would have
taken his position on the ground rather than on the
railroad cars but for the inexperience of the brakemen.
This required petitioner to take his position on ~op
of the cars in order to assist the brakemen-a functlon
not ordinarily performed by a ya~d conducto!. We think
it should have been left to the JUry to dectde whether
the respondent's direction to complete_ the spotting
operation within 30 minutes, plus ~e( tmp_ort~nc~ of
the brakemen assigned to perform this hot JOb, trught
have precipitated petitioner's injury. (The debatable
quality of that issue, the fact that fair-minded men
might reach different conclusions, emphasize the appropriateness of leaving the question to the jury. The jury
is the tribunal under our legal system to decide that
type of issue (Tiller v. Atlantic Coast LineR. Co., 318
US 54, 87 L.Ed. 610, 63 S. Ct. 444, 143 ALR 967)
as well as issues involving controverted evidence. Jones
v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co., 128 US 443, 445;
Washington & Georgetown R. Co. v. McDade, 135
US 554, 572. To withdraw such a question from the
jury is to usurp its functions.' Bailey v. Central Vermont
R. Co., 319 US 350, 353, 354, 97 L.Ed. 1144, 1147,
63 S. Ct. 1062 (1943) :·
Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc. ( 1960) ____ US ___ _
5 L.Ed. 2 (d) 20, 81 S. Ct. ____ , was under the Jones Act, but the
court has expressly held that the standard under the Jones
Act is the same as under the Federal Employers Liability
Act. See Ferguson v. J\1oore-McC,ormack, supra. Plaintiff was
injured when a wrench dropped on his left foot. The Captain's
report filled out immediately after the plaintiff related the
facts to him stated: ('While working with pump man in pump
room, man said he dropped the wrench on his foot and his
toe has been sore ever since." Plaintiff claimed that the wrench
was not reasonably fit for its intended use. The court said
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that the question was whether the evidence was sufficient
"to raise a jury question whether the respondent failed to
exercise due care in furnishing the wrench which was not a
reasonable suitable appliance.'' At the trial, plaintiff claimed
that the wrench slipped off a nut when it was struck with a
mallet. The court said that even though there was no direct
evidence of play in the jaw of the wrench, the jury Ctcould
reasonably have found that the wrench repeatedly slipped
from the nut because the jaw of the wrench did not properly
grip them." A jury question was thus made and the Rogers
case was quoted for the proposition that nit does not matter,
from the evidence, the jury may also with reason on grounds
of probability attribute the result to other causes.''
The facts of the case at bar bring it well within the lines
drawn by the Supreme Court not only on the principles stated
in Rogers v. Missouri RR but on the kind of factual situations
which the Supreme Court repeatedly has ruled were jury questions. The accident here did not Ct just happen." It was the
result of a chain of events. All of the events were put into
motion by the railroad itself or its employees and agents.
Defendant, in effect, hung the trap on the post. Defendant
required plaintiff to use the trap without advising him of its
hazardous condition. Defendant failed to furnish a piece of
wire not unsafe for ordinary use.
The jury by its verdict, and the trial judge in ruling on
the motions presented, determined after hearing the facts and
weighing the probabilities and taking into account the physical
facts with respect to the accident and no doubt considering
the undisputed evidence that when the plaintiff dropped the
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coil to the ground it spread out, determined that employer
negligence played at least some part in the injury. The conclusion of the jury is not only a fair inference, it is compelled
by the evidence in this case. The jury could and did find, with
reason, that defendant's negligence played a part in causing
the accident. It is submitted that the Supreme Court has ruled
that tcjudges are to fix their sites primarily to make that
appraisal, and, if that test is made, are bound to find that a
case for the jury is made out of whether or not the evidence
allows the jury a choice of other probabilities." Rogers v.
Missouri RR, supra.

POINT II.
DEFENDANT CANNOT COMPLAIN THAT TWO
JURORS WERE EXCUSED.
In its Point No. II, the defendant argues that the case
should be retried because two prospective jurors, Stanton Peck
and Ray A. Norton, were excused by the Court on its own
initiative. The defendant argues to the court that the selection
of jurors is particularly important to the railroad company
in FELA cases (De£. Brief 18, 19). The defendant in this
case requested a special panel and during the interrogation
of the panel the court excused Messrs. Peck and Norton because
the former was related to one of the attorneys for the plaintiff
and the latter was a business associate. Notwithstanding the
special care with which defendant on appeal says it selects
the jurors, its counsel made no objection to the court's actions
and did not bring the matter to the attention of the court
in any manner whatever until after the trial of the case and
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the jury had retired to consider its verdict. The matter was
not formally brought to the attention of the court and counsel
for the plaintiff until after the verdict was returned. Defendant now argues that it should have a second chance with
a new jury which presumably it would select with the same
painstaking care employed in the selection of the first.
It is submitted that the raising of this particular point
on appeal demonstrates as much as any other single argument
made, the inherent weakness of the defendant's position in
this case.
The first juror excused was Mr. Peck. In 1957 George
M. McMillan, one of the attorneys for plaintiff, was associated
in the practice of law with McKay, Burton, McMillan & Richards in the Newhouse Building. He acted as the attorney
for the Allsteel Office Supply Company and in connection
with that employment was requested to review the stockholders' agreement between the stockholders of that company
and Stanton Peck. Part of his duties involved certain estate
planning problems with Mr. Peck. An attorney-client relationship existed between Mr. Peck and Mr. McMillan at that time

(R. 65-A, 65-B).
Mr. Norton and George M. McMillan are second cousins,
but more than that, they have had close family and social
relationships for more than 30 years. They went to school
together, participated together in band, orchestra, opera, choral
work and similar activities. They traveled together to various
cities in the states giving concerts and participating in
various kinds of music contests ( 54-B, 65-C). Mr. Norton's
wife is the secretary of the n1anager of one of the regular
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clients of McMillan and they are together frequently at social
gatherings related to such employment ( 65-C). The record
the Court's action in
in this case is to the effect that
excusing prospective jurors Norton and Peck was intended
by the Court to insure the defendant corporation's having
a fair and impartial trial," and it appeared from
the
atmosphere, chain of events and occurrences at the time of
the selection of said jury that the general feeling in the courtroom appeared to be that such action by the Court was for
the purpose of insuring a fair trial to the defendant corporation
and was not intended or generally felt to be adverse to its
interests." ( 65-e).
tC

•

•

•

tC

•••

What the defendant is arguing here is that it takes great
pains to select its jury in such a manner as to enable it to
have another chance when it loses the lawsuit. There is no
possible justification for allowing the defendant to hand-pick
two juries.
The law is well settled both before and after the adoption
of Rule 46 that a litigant must call to the attention of the
trial judge diligently any irregularity in the selection of a
jury he expects to claim error on appeal. Almost squarely in
point is Adler v. Adler (1950), 61 SE (2d) 824, 207 Ga. 394.
There the trial judge disqualified four jurors on voir dire.
The proponents of a will which was the subject of the litigation
made no objection and the Supreme Court of Georgia held
that failure to object constituted a waiver of any irregularities.
The court follo\ved Gunther v. State (1917) 92 SE 314, 19
Ga. App. 772 ( 2), which applied the same rule in a criminal
case.
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Courts have held uniformly that a party having knowledge
of any matter which might affect the integrity or impartiality
of a juror cannot remain silent and take his chance that the
verdict may be favorable and then complain if an adverse
judgment is rendered. 'fhe rule has been applied in a variety
of factual situations. In Arena v. John P. Squire Company
(1947) 73 NE(2d) 836, 321 Mass. 424, the defendant had
been denied a new trial after an adverse judgment. Defendant
appealed urging that the trial judge did not ascertain whether
the jurors had talked to anyone about the case during an interval between deliberating sessions. The Massachuset!ts
Supreme Court indicated that such irregularities were within
the discretion of the trial judge on a motion for new trial.
It stated: "A party having knowledge of a matter that might
affect the integrity or impartiality of a jury cannot remain silent
and take his chance that the verdict may be favorable and
then complain if an adverse verdict is returned. Hallock v.
Franklin, 2 Met. 558; Rowe v. Canney, 139 Mass. 41, 29 NE
219; Randolph v. O'Riorden, 155 Mass. 331, 29 NE 583; Hill
v. Greenwood, 160 Mass. 256, 35 NE 558. See also Young v.
City of New York, 5 NYS (2d) 74, 265 App. Div. 881."
Utah abolished the necessity of formal exceptions long
before the adoption of Rule 46 (1933 Code, Sec. 104-24-18,
104-39-2). The committee on the adoption of the Code reported that Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
was the same as the federal rule "with some unnecessary
language deleted." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, page 63,
Committee Note. Rule 46 in the Federal Rules became effective
in federal courts September 16, 1938. (Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 86; Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and
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Procedure, Rules Edition, Vol. 1, pg. 18). Rule 46 stands as
promulgated at that time. Moore Federal Practice 2nd Ed.,
par. 46.01. Prof. Moore discusses the effect of Rule 46 at
par. 46.02. He points out that formal exceptions were made

unnecessary but he states:
''The rule retains, however, the fundamental basis
of the former practice by requiring a party to make
known to the court the action desired, and his grounds
therefor, at the time the ruling or order is made or
sought, if he has an opportunity to do so. The purpose
of the former practice was two-fold: ( 1) to appraise
the court of the litigant's position so that the court
in the furthering of justice might correct its ruling
was shown to be error; and (b) to permit an opponent
to obviate the defect where possible. Rule 46 retains
this purpose. It is still necessary for the party to make
it clear to the court that he objects to the court's action,
and to state the grounds on which he basis his objection, in order that the defect may be obviated, is posst"bl e ... ''
Federal courts have consistently ruled since the adoption
of Rule 46 that irregularities in the selection of a jury must
be called to the attention of the trial judge at the time if
a party expects to predicate error upon them. In U.S. z·. Meyer
(CCA 7, 1940) 113 F(2d) 387 at 396, the court said:
HA complete answer to the defendants' position with
regard to the venire exists in the well known rule that
errors in the manner of drawing a jury must be presented by challenge to the array before, or at the latest,
at the time of the examination of the jury . . . The
record discloses no prejudice or injury to defendants.
And the charges of defendants are vague and uncertain
in this respect. Courts do not reverse in such a situatton,
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unless the record discloses that the party complaining
was substantially prejudiced."
The observation of Judge Clark for the Second Circuit in
Reck v. Pacific and Atlantic SS Co. (CCA 2, 1950) 180 F(2d)
866, 870, although on a different point, is particularly appropriate here:
n1~his

is peculiarly the type of objection which under
rule 46, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, should have
been made clear at the time, since it could and undoubtedly would have led to an immediate correction of
whatever error of form may have been disclosed. Defendant cannot entrap a successful plaintiff by thus
reserving its fire, particular! y on a matter as inconsequential as this. We think defendant received a fair
trial, and there is no reason to disturb the judgment on
the verdict against it..,
The defendant admits c•the right to challenge a juror is
a right which may be waived" (De£. Brief 21). Conversely,
the right to object to the improper excusing of a witness may
also be waived. These waivers occur every day in the courtrooms of the state. Jurors request to be excused for business
or personal reasons, and judges, without even disclosing to
the litigants or their counsel the nature of the reason, excuse
the jurors from the panel. One of the jurors in this case was
thus excused (Juror No. 1, R. 9). Certainly a party cannot
stand by and permit a juror to be relieved from duty, then
after it has lost the case, ask the appellant court to reverse
on the theory that if that particular juror instead of another
had heard the facts, appellant may not have lost. Rule 46
makes unnecessary formal exceptions to rulings of the court,
but it states celt is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling
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or order of the court is made or sought makes known to the
court the action which he desires the court to take or his
objection to the action of the court and his grounds therefor . . . " It is to be observed that the defendant's counsel
in this case requested a recess to discuss the selection of jurors
with his client before the jurors were selected ( 94) and after
the selection the court stated:
((Are these the individuals selected, Mr. McMillan?"
''Mr. McMillan: Yes, your Honor.
''The Court: Mr. Ashton?
((Mr. Ashton: Yes, your Honor."
Thus, despite being present and having ample opportunity
to object to the excusing of the jurors Peck and Norton, and
knowing that the court had actually exercised two challenges
for the defendant which obviously were intended for the defendant's benefit, the defendant went to trial without breathing
a word to anyone that it was prejudiced.
In this postur~ it is submitted that the appellant cannot
be heard to argue as it does in pages 22 and 23 of its brief
that if only jurors Peck and Norton could have been retained,
it could have excused two of the women. This is a particularly
facitious argument in view of the fact that the record shows
that the defendant exercised its challenges with respect to
Edward J. Callahan, a tile setter (R. 9, 85), Fred Naisbitt, a
boiler operator (R. 9, 85), and Max A. Finlayson, a powder
lineman for Hercules Powder (R. 9, 84).
In sum on this point, appellant does not even suggest
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that it can show prejudice. Instead, it tacitly admits that the
Court's action in excusing two prospective jurors was thought
to be in its interest at the time. It failed to object or otherwise indicate disapproval of the court's action. Having taken
its chances with the jury selected, defendant is now in no
position to urge error.

POINT III.
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT.

(a) Instruction No. 7 was adequate and not misleading
to the jury.
In its Point No. III the defendant takes exception to the
italicized portion of the following sentence in Instruction No. 7:
" ... This duty does not require the absolute elimination of all danger, or hazard, but it does require
the elimination of all danger or hazard which the
exercise of reasonable care could remove or guard
against, and this applies to the condition with which
we are concerned."
The word (Cthis" was obviously intended to relate not only
to the latter portion of the said sentence which described the
danger which had to be eliminated, but the portion of the
sentence which refers to the danger which does not have to
be eliminated. The defendant asks the court to disregard the
meaning of the whole instruction and to totally disregard
the portion of Instruction No. 7 prior to the phrase to which
objection is taken. In other words, the sentence might be
construed to mean CCThis duty does not require the absolute
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elimination of all danger of hazard . . . and this applies to
the condition with which we are concerned" with the same
certainty that defendant asks the court to construe it, namely,
(' . . . it does require the elimination of all danger of hazard
which the exercise of reasonable care could remove or guard
against, and this applies to the condition with which we are
concerned." It is apparent that the Court was simply telling
the jury that foreseeability of harm is an element of negligence.
This is clear from the balance of the instruction:
"The amount of caution required by that duty varies
in direct proportion to the dangers known to be involved in this work. To put the matter in another way,
the amount of care required of a railroad company in
the exercise of ordinary care, to furnish its employees
with a reasonably safe place within which to work, or
safe tools and equipment increases or decreases as
do the dangers that reasonably should be apprehended.
Failure of the defendant to discharge this duty of using
reasonable care to provide its employees with a safe
place in which to work or with safe appliances, equipment or tools for his work would constitute negligence."
Such is the obvious meaning of the instruction when considered with Instructions 8, 10 and 16.

(b) Instruction No. 16 was not prejudicial.
In its Instruction No. 16, the Court specifically instructed
the jury that if "the injuries were caused solely by the negligence of the plaintiff or that the defendant was not negligent,
you must return a verdict in favor of the defendant and against
the plaintiff no cause of action." Defendant's attempting to
take the word "or" in subparagraph 3 of the Instruction out
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of context totally perverts the substance and effect of the
instruction.
It is simply not true, moreover, that there was no instruction on proximate cause. In Instruction No. 10, requested by
the defendant, the Court advised the jury, (<Negligence, if any,
and whether such negligence, if any, was a proximate cause
of the accident resulting in in jury to Siciliano must be proved
by plaintiff Siciliano to the extent of a preponderance of the
evidence" ( 48), and proximate cause was defined as "that
cause which in a natural continuous sequence, unbroken by
any new cause, produced the injury and without which the
injury would not have occurred" ( 41), and again in Instruction
No. 6 the Court said: CCI£ the injury is caused solely by the
negligence of the employee, or if the defendant is not negligent,
then, of course, no recovery may be had by said employee."
The defendant's argument to the effect that the instructions
as a whole eliminated the necessity of finding proximate cause
is wholly fallacious.

(c) The instruction on assumption of risk was not prejudicial.
In its Point No. 5, defendant argues that the portion of
the Court's Instruction No. 6 on assumption of risk should
not have been given. The argument is based on the idea that
assumption of risk is not an issue in the case. In Instruction
No. 6 the Court was explaining in a general way the provisions
of the Federal Employers Liability Act. That act expressly
provides that assumption of risk does not constitute a defense.
Bruner v. McCarthy, 105 Ut. 399, 142 P(2d) 649, involved
a situation where apparently the Court was reaching for a
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basis upon which to predicate reversal. In the course of the
discussion, the author of the majority opinion asserted as
pure dicta that an instruction on assumed risk should not have
been given. The Court expressly found, however, that giving
of the instruction was not prejudicial. Similarly in Moore v.
U. P. R.R., 4 Ut. 2, 255, 292 P(2d) 849, the Court expressly
refused to rule that the giving of an instruction on assumed
risk was reversible error.
In the case at bar, it is gratuitous to suppose that defendant's counsel had not argued a point in connection with
defendant's motion to dismiss whereby the Court felt it necessary to point out that employees did not assume the risk of
employment as far as FELA cases are concerned. It is to be
observed that the instruction on assumed risk was only a
statement of the statutory provision. The law was correctly
stated in the instruction and the defendant does not argue
to the contrary. The jury was clearly instructed on the elements
of liability and could not possibly have been misled. The
jury was plainly told that the only basis for recovery by
plaintiff was a finding that the defendant was negligent and
that such negligence played a part in producing plaintiff's
injury. It must be realized that the rule is that plaintiff can
recover if defendant's negligence played any part at all. Roger
v. Missouri R.R. and other cases cited in Point I of this
brief. Particularly inasmuch as the sentence complained of
was contained in an explanation of the principles provided by
the Federal Employers Liability Act, it cannot be stretched
out of context to justify reversal in this action.

(d) Failure to instruct that the railroad conzpany has the

26
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

right to assume that employees would exercise reasonable care
for their own safety is not prejudicial error.
The court instructed the jury over and over again that
the plaintiff could not recover if any negligence by him was
the sole proximate cause of the accident (Instruction No. 6,
R. 44; of Instruction No. 8, R. 46; Instruction No. 10, R. 48).
To say that the defendant had the right to assume that
the employees would exercise reasonable care for their own
safety could be argued to mean that even though the defendant
was negligent, if the plaintiff was also negligent, i.e., if he
did not exercise reasonable care for his own safety, he could
not recover at all. The FELA expressly provides that contributory negligence does not constitute a defense unless such
negligence is the sole proximate cause of the accident. Adopting
the defendant's theory as argued in its Point No. 6 would be
to tell the jury in substance and effect that if the defendant
did not exercise care for his own safety, that is to say, if he
was contributorily negligent, that such negligence would constitute a defense; thus the purpose and meaning of the act
would be thwarted. While such a device may be a credit to
the ingenuity of counsel for the railroad, it simply does not
constitute the law in cases of this kind. The defendant's requested instructions with respect to contributory negligence
were substantially given by the court. The form of the instruction as required by the defendant that the defendant ((was
not required to foresee negligence on the part of the plaintiff''
was not a correct statement of the law. Failure to give the
instruction cannot constitute error.
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POINT IV
THE AMOUNT OF THE AWARD WAS NOT EX.
CESSIVE.
The jury found that the damages sustained by plaintiH
were in the sum of $30,000 and reduced them $7500 for
contributory negligence. The jury was carefully instructed
on the question of damages (Instruction No. 17, R. 55, 56).
It was told that ((sympathetic feelings have no place whatever
in the trial of a case in a court of justice" (Instruction No.
18, R. 57). The Court's Instruction No. 14 is not objected
to by defendant here. It may be assumed, therefore, that the
defendant is in agreement that the jury could properly take
into account the factors enumerated in that instruction. Plaintiff's age, earning capacity are not the only relevant . factors. Also to be considered are the character and extent and
severity of his injuries, the pain and suffering, if any, which
he may expect reasonably to endure in the future, While at
the trial level defendant apparently concedes that permanent
disability is only one of the elements of damage, its brief
on appeal chooses to ignore completely any consideration
of the extent to which plaintiff has been totally deprived of
vision in his left eye, his physical and mental suffering, the
shock to his nervous system and impairment of his general
health (R. 52).
Courts of review have been loathe to upset jury findings
with respect to the money damage involved in the loss of
an eye. In National Bt·ands t'. L11orton Tire Co., S. Ct. Fla.
( 1942) 150 Fla. 349, 7 SE (2d) 456, the Court said: "It is
impossible to fix the value of the human eye. There can be
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no doubt that such a loss is tremendous." That concept permeates all the decisions where the question is considered. A
discussion as to the amounts of verdicts both by juries and
awards by judges on the loss of one eye or for blindness
in one eye is treated at Belli, Vol 5, Modern Trials, Damages,
Section 212, beginning at page 253. Cases are tabulated from
state and federal courts beginning at page 2 55. Annotations
on the subject as far as reported cases are concerned are at
16 ALR (2d) 130, 420, 102 ALR 1258, 1259, and 46 ALR
1282, 1283. In Lopez v. Price (1958) 145 Conn. 560, 145
Atl. (2d) 127, the court considered the question as to
whether an award of $75,000 for reduction of vision in one
eye and related injuries was excessive. It said:
ttThe test is whether the amount of each award complained of falls somewhere within the necessarily uncertain limits of just damages or whether the size of
the award so shocks the sense of justice as to compel
the conclusion that the jury were influenced by partiality, prejudice, mis.take or corruption. The refusal
of the trial court to disturb a verdict is strong support
for its propriety. Sheiman v. Sheiman, 143 Conn. 222,
224, 121 A.2d 285. The question is one peculiarly
within the province of the jury. Juries may differ widely
in the conclusions which they reach in apparently similar cases, and, in fact, in any given case one jury might
arrive at a result substantially different from that of
another jury. This flexibility, though it may lead to
uncertainty, is a necessary concomitant of the jury
system as it operates.

*

*

*

*

ttThe vision in her right eye was reduced to 20/200,
which is considered the ophthalmological equivalent
of total loss of vision in that eye. She cannot read fine
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print or do very fine work such as sewing. If she ever
works in a factory, she will not be able to put s~all
parts together. She will not be_ ab_le to do clencal
work. As far as earning capactty ts conc~rned, h~r
right eye is for all practical p~r.Poses blmd. Th1s
impairment is permanent. In addttton _t? 100 per cent
loss of vision in the right eye, her abtltty to use both
eyes for depth perception has dis~ppeared: She will
not be able to take part in sports ltke tennts, baseball
or handball, where there is a fast moving object. She
will have difficulty in judging the position of any fast
moving object, such as a moving automobile. She
will be handicapped in driving. She will have a rela·
tively blind side on her right and will tend to bump
into things on that side. . . . However, the most itn
portant residual, regardless of the 100 per cent loss
of vision, the lack of depth perception and the walleye,
is the fact she is now left with no reserve eye.
(The question of damages in personal injury cases,
especially in these times of changing values, is always
a difficult one. Prosser v. Richman, 133 Conn. 253, 256,
50 A. 2d 85. Assessment of damages is peculiarly within
the province of the jury and their determination should
be set aside only when the verdict is plainly excessive
and exorbitant. Szivos v. Leonard, 113 Conn. 522, 525,
155 A. 637; Rutkowski v. Conn. Light & Power Co.,
100 Conn. 49, 54, 123 A. 25. Proper compensation for
personal injuries cannot be computed by mathematical
formula, and the law furnishes no precise rule for their
assessment. Russakoff v. Stamford, 134 Conn. 450, 455,
58 A. 2d 517; Samaha v. Mauro, 104 Conn. 300, 302,
132 A. 455; Knight v. Continental Automobile Mfg.
Co., 82 Conn. 291, 293, 73 A. 751. The only practical
test to apply to a verdict is \Yhether the award of dama_ge~ falls s.omewhere within the necessarily uncertain
ltmtts of fatr and reasonable compensation in the particular case, or whether the verdict so shocks the sense
u
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of justice as to compel the conclusion that the jury were
influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption.' Slabinski v. Dix, 138 Conn. 625, 629, 88 A. 2d
115, 117. In the light of this test, the jury could reasonably have returned the verdict awarding the plaintiff
Pamela Lopez $75,000. Consequently, we cannot say
that the amount of the award to her was excessive."
The case of Chan v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co. (1955)
132 Cal. App. (2d) 420, 287 P(2d) 78, is also helpful on
the facts. In that case a 48-year-old plaintiff suffered the loss
of his right eye when he was struck by a concrete chip which
was the result of a piece of steel falling on a cement block.
The cement chipped off and flew into plaintiff's eye and his
action was under the FELA. The court sustained the recovery
on the question of negligence and affirmed the trial judge's
decision that $25,000 was a reasonable net recovery.
The experts in this case tesified that the plaintiff had
lost 100<fo of his vision in the left eye for all practical purposes, and that at the time of the maximum recovery from
the accident before cataract had formed on the left eye, his
visual loss was 87 .3<fo (R. 160). A cataract can be removed
only by surgery and the surgery could not be performed at
the present time without producing double vision ( 161, 162) .
Plaintiff has lost depth perception and has a severe restriction
upon peripheral vision ( 163, 164). Neither doctor called by
the plaintiff recommended that the cataract on the left eye
be removed but testified "It is to his interest not to have it
removed at this time" ( 164).
The plaintiff's wife testified that in addition to the fact
that he was in the hospital for approximately four weeks and
lost seven weeks of work, she had observed marked changes
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in the plaintiff's habits and attitudes since the accident (132).
He cannot drive the car. He bumps his head getting in and
out of the car. He stumbles and is slowed down. He is nervous,
irritable and has had a heart attack ( 132, 133) ·
It is noteworthy that the defendant itself while conceding
the propriety of including these factors in arriving at damages
did not undertake to reduce damages by using mortality tables
and interest rates in its presentation to the jury.
Defendant asked the trial judge for a new trial on the
grounds contended for in Point 7 of its brief to this Court
(Ground No. 5 of the Motion for New Trial, R. 65). This
question is generally addressed to the discretion of the trial
court. The trial judge in this case heard the testimony of the
witnesses, listened to the argument of counsel and denied
the plaintiffs motion. There is nothing to suggest and defendant
does not argue that he abused his discretion.
The plaintiff in the case at bar was only 53 years of age
at the time of the accident. Impairment of the total visual
system was fixed without contradiction at 25<fo. All the
limitations of body functions inherent in the loss will remain
with plaintiff for the rest of his life. It is submitted that
recovery in the net amount of $22,500 is easily within the
range of discretion which necessarily is given to juries in cases
of this kind. Certainly it does not tend to indicate passion or
prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Points II through VIII as treated by appellant in its brief
are manifestly of the fly specking variety. The case \Yas tried
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to a jury which was virtually hand-picked by the defendant.
If any irregularity occurred in its selection, it was thought at
the time to be for the defendant's benefit. The defendant
acquiesced and ratified any technical deficiencies. Not having
brought them to the attention of the trial court at the time,
it cannot urge error here. Individually and collectively the
instructions were fair and ade9uate. Considered as a whole,
the instructions were most favorable to the defendant, and the
verdict was well within the latitude necessarily given to juries
in cases of this kind.
At first blush it may appear that a question is presented
as to whether there was evidence of negligence. It may be
conceded for the purpose of argument that an ordinary roll
of wire hanging on a nail may not be unsafe, but analysis of
the facts of this case compel the conclusion that the particular
coil of wire involved here was a dangerous trap. The jury
necessarily found that the trap was sprung when the weight
of the coil released the ends and one of them flipped like
lightning and struck plaintiff's eye. This is the crux of the
case. Under Rogers v. Missouri Railroad and subsequent
cases, the jury's verdict is conclusive on the defendant in this
court. The judgment must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
CLARENCE M. BECK
Felt Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
GEORGE M. McMILLAN
1020 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Respondent
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